On the notion of
existence

I saw a vase drawn on page five of Mike Kelley’s Existance Problems. The glimpse of a seemingly dormant
memory: the vase is mentioned as archetypical object
of existence in countless ancient
philosophical Indian texts. This is certainly due to its common
presence and clear functional purpose; it is also more specifically considered
to be a particular type of object. In Sanskrit this object is called vikāryam, it involves the appearance
of a new quality in the matter
which is subjected to that transformation. Just like in the example,
he transforms gold into a
bracelet, in the same way he transforms clay into a vase. It is an object which
exists only in its final phase – after the transformation of the original
matter – but also all along the action involving its creation since
the intention is present in the maker from the very start. In Kelley’s letter,
the vase is represented as falling off a surface, he wonders what is being
displaced by that vase taking up that space, he calls it ‘the living dead’ and
wants to knock it off. I won’t be any
longer.

This is not it. A few years back I translated a late medieval Indian
commentary about the notion of action and, in particular, that of existence
as action. The author says that the verb ‘to be’ (bhū-) is employed in the sense of ‘existence’ (sattā) and that this existence can
be explained as ‘the fact of carrying one’s own self’ (ātmabhāraṇam).
I was, again, struck when, in his letter, Kelley writes of ‘self perpetuating’ when he is concerned with proving his own
existence through the mirrors which are the others. What is existence if not
the the continuation of one’s self?

While I can’t neglect that the starting
point of Kelley’s
reasoning is an ontological (and visual?) one, I for once
want to enjoy the freedom
of not making any specific
point. The ancient
Indian philosophers in question were considering the linguistic aspect
of it all but I can’t help but notice
a similarity between
the dialectic tools that
both they and Kelley employ while demonstrating what existence is. Indian philosophers distinguish between
general and specific actions, the first being
actions such as doing and being, and the second
such as cooking or walking. When someone asks
‘what is he doing?’, the answer cannot be ‘he is existing’. Not because
existing is not an action
– the philosophers have proven
that existence is the action
par excellence because presupposed by any other action.
But it is not a particular one, such as the one expressed by ‘he cooks’ etc. One asks for the specific, unknown activity
of something whose existence is, on the contrary, already known, and not at all
for the known existence of someone. For this reason, one cannot reply ‘he is
existing’ since existing is also a general action just like doing. Kelley unconsciously (?) makes use of this meant-to-be
flawless question-answer method in his letter:

hi 1) fine, what have you been doing?

2) not much. Just hanging around
yea, just being here

1)  just existing

2)  yes, I exist 

me too

There is only one exception, according
to the philosophers, for which one is
allowed to answer ‘he exists’ to that question, namely if one is
concerned with the disappearing of one’s self, through death. If existing is
understood as I am still
alive, I have not disappeared yet, I linger.
Is it possible Kelley had this in mind while questioning existence? And don’t we
all.

This unrequired comparison finds its reason
in a simple appreciation for common and time transversal mental human categories.

Beatrice Bonino,
2024